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Abstract
This note reports part of a larger study of ￿petty corruption￿by gov-
ernment bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects.
Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition of approval. Entre-
preneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to
obtain all of the required approvals. In a dynamic game model we investi-
gate (1) the multiplicity of equilibria, (2) the equilibria that are "socially
e¢ cient," and (3) the equilibria that maximize the total expected bureau-
crats￿bribe income. We compare these results with those for the case in
which entrepreneurs apply directly to the bureaucrats.
1 Introduction
This note is part of an on-going project to study, from a game-theoretic point
of view, the phenomenon of petty corruption by government bureaucrats. A
typical example involves the process of obtaining government approval of a new
business activity (called here a project) to make sure that it complies with the
laws on workers￿safety, safe construction standards, environmental hazards, etc.
The entrepreneur organizing the project must obtain the approval of each of a
set of bureaucrats (called here the track), often in a prescribed order. Each
bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition of approval. Although each of
the bribes may be small (hence the adjective "petty￿ ), the total amount of the
bribes may be so large that the project is no longer pro￿table. In this case,
a project that would otherwise be economically viable will not be undertaken.
Thus the system of bribes not only transfers money from the entrepreneurs to
the bureaucrats, but also results in a dead weight loss corresponding to the
total value of the projects that are not undertaken. For many economies, such
losses have been recognized as substantial. (For an extended introduction to
1this topic, and references to the related literature, see (Lambert-Mogiliansky,
Majumdar, and Radner, 2007), hereafter referred to as LMRa.)
In our published work thus far we have focused on the case in which the
entrepreneurs apply directly to the bureaucrats for approval of their project. We
consider a situation in which a sequence of entrepreneurs have the opportunity
to apply in turn to the track. Each entrepreur￿ s project has a value that will be
realized if the project is approved. This value is known to the entrepreneur, but
not to the bureaucrats in the track, nor to the other entrepreneurs. We formulate
a dynamic game that captures the main features of this situation, and in the
context of this game we investigate (1) the existence of an equilibrium of the
game, (2) the multiplicity of equilibria, (3) the characterization of the equilibria
that are "socially e¢ cient" in a particular sense, and (4) the characterization of
the equilibria that maximize the total expected bribe income of the bureaucrats.
However, it is often the case that entrepreneurs use the services of an in-
termediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all of the required approvals.
In this note we consider a variation of the above analysis for a model in which
entrepreneurs apply, if at all, through a single intermediary (Section 2.) In Sec-
tion 3 we compare the results to those for the model with no intermediary. In
Section 4 we provide some thoughts about various extensions of the model. In
particular, one important extension would be to model the enforcement of the
anti-corruption laws, and the possible corruption of the bureaucrats￿supervi-
sors. This topic is related to some of the work of Leo Hurwicz; see Hurwicz
1993, 1998). Section 5 contains some brief bibliographic notes, and the list of
references.
2 Formal Models
As noted above, the new theoretical results in this note concern a dynamic game
in which a sequence of entrepreneurs apply through an intermediary to a track
of bureaucrats for approval of their projects. However, to put the model in the
context of the broader research agenda, we start by presenting a model of a
one-stage game in which a single entrepreneur applies directly to the track of
bureaucrats, without any intermediation. We shall follow that with a description
of the one-stage game with an intermediary, and then an analysis of a full-blown
dynamic game with an intermediary.
[Note: The material on the model of the one-stage game without an inter-
mediary is taken from (LMRa).]
2.1 A One-Stage Game without an Intermediary
The players in the one-stage game consist of a single entrepreneur (EN) and
a single track of N bureaucrats (BUs), with N ￿ 2; arranged in a speci￿c
sequence. In order to get her project approved, EN must apply to and obtain
approval from each of the BUs in the prescribed order (i.e. BU1 ￿rst, then BU2
2etc.). If the project is rejected by any one BU, the game ends and EN does not
proceed further in the track.
Here is the complete description of the extensive form of the game. Let
V denote the project￿ s potential value, which is uniformly distributed on some
closed interval, which we may normalize to be [0;1]. The probability distrib-
ution of V (the ￿prior￿ ) is common knowledge, but the realized value of V is
known only to EN.
If and when EN applies to BUn she incurs a cost c > 0. For convenience
of exposition, this cost is assumed to be the same for all BUs. The cost c is
known to all the players. If EN applies to BUn, let bn ￿ 0 denote the bribe
demanded by him. The project is approved if and only if the bribe is paid.
The bribe is demanded on a ￿take-it-or-leave-it￿basis, so that if EN refuses to
pay the bribe the game ends. It is assumed that the BUs do not observe the
bribes demanded by the other BUs.
Let an = 1 or 0 according as EN does or does not apply to BUn. If she does
apply, she incurs the application cost c > 0 and then learns the magnitude bn
of the bribe demanded by BUn. Let pn = 1 or 0 according as EN does or does
not pay the bribe. Note that if an = 0 or pn = 0 then the game is over. Thus,
if an = 0 we have pn = 0 and if pn = 0 then am = 0 for all m > n:
Call the part of the game in which EN faces BUn the nth step (n = 1;:::;N).
The action taken by EN in step n is the pair (an;pn). The action taken by
BUn in step n is, of course, bn.
For n ￿ 1, let Hn denote the history of the game through step n, i.e., the
sequence of actions taken by all players through step n. A strategy for EN is a
sequence of functions, ￿ = fA1;P1;:::;AN;PNg, which determine EN￿ s actions
according to:
an = An(V;Hn￿1); (1)
pn = Pn(V;Hn￿1;an;bn): (2)
(Here H0 denotes an exogenous constant, the "prehistory of the game.")
Since BUn does not know the magnitudes of any previously demanded bribes,
his strategy for the game is the magnitude of the bribe he demands,
bn ￿ 0:
To complete the description of the game, we must describe the players￿payo⁄
functions. The payo⁄ for BUn is the bribe he demands, if it is paid, i.e.,
Un = pnbn: (3)
The payo⁄ for EN is the value of the project if the project is approved, less
the sum of the application costs and bribes paid (whether or not the project is
completely approved). Thus EN￿ s payo⁄ is
U0 = pNV ￿
X
1￿n￿N
(anc + pnbn): (4)
3Finally, without loss of generality, assume:
0 < Nc < 1: (5)
(Otherwise, no project would be pro￿table.)
It may be of interest to quote here some results about equilibria of this
game, although they will not be used in what follows. As usual, a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium of the game is a pro￿le of strategies such that no player can
increase his or her expected pay-o⁄ by unilaterally changing his or her strategy.
A strategy is (weakly) undominated if there is no other strategy that yields
the player as high a payo⁄ for all strategy pro￿les of the other players, and a
strictly higher payo⁄ for some strategy pro￿le of the other players. For our ￿rst
result, we shall con￿ne ourselves to equilibria in undominated strategies. The
￿rst result is that there is no equilibrium in undominated strategies in which the
project is approved -with positive probability. (See [LMRa], as well as [Lambert,
Majumdar, and Radner, 2008], hereafter referred to as LMRb.) We note that
for N ￿ 2, the theorem is valid even when c = 0.
The second result concerns a family of equilibria in which no EN applies
to the ￿rst BU, and hence no project is ever approved. A strategy pro￿le
in this family will be called a null strategy pro￿le (NSP). A particular NSP is
characterized by N parameters, b
0
n, n = 1;:::;N. The parameter b
0
n represents
the bribe that EN expects BUn to demand, and it is also the bribe that BUn
plans to demand. These parameters satisfy the conditions:
0 < b
0









N < 1: (7)
The EN￿ s strategy is: for 1 ￿ n ￿ N, EN applies to BUn only if the value
of her project is as large as the sum of the expected cost of completing the track,
whereas she pays the actual bribe demanded only if the value of her project is
as large as the sum of this actual bribe and the cost of completing the track if
the remaining BUs demand their planned bribes.
The strategy of BUn is: If EN applies to him, demand the bribe b
0
n.
As is common in game-theoretic analyses, we wish to con￿ne attention to
equilibria in which the strategies are in some sense "credible," which involves
examining the behavior of the system "o⁄ the equilibrium path." To this end,
for the purpose of the following theorem we ￿nd it convenient to replace the
requirement that strategies be undominated by a condition that we call ad-
missibility, which is in some sense more demanding, but also somewhat more
complex to state. First, a strategy of BU n is admissible if the bribe demanded is
strictly between zero and one. A bribe pro￿le is admissible if each BU￿ s strategy
is admissible. A strategy for EN is admissible if it is a best response to some
admissible bribe pro￿le.
For a BU, we alter somewhat the de￿nition of undominated strategy. An
admissible strategy for BUn is quasiundominated if there is no other admissible
4strategy for him that yields him as high a payo⁄ for all admissible strategy
pro￿les of the other players, and a strictly higher payo⁄ for some admissible
strategy pro￿le of the other players.
Finally, an equilibrium strategy pro￿le is admissible if EN￿ s strategy is ad-
missible, and and each BU￿ s strategy is admissible and quasiundominated.
Theorem 1 Suppose that,
for each n;1=2 < b0
n < 1;
then the corresponding NSP is an admissible equilibrium, and for every value of
V , EN does not apply to BU1.
In the model of the dynamic game without an intermediary (which will not
be described here formally), a large class of equilibria (including second-best
equilibria) are sustained by threats to revert to an NSP equilibrium if any player
defects ("Nash reversion"). This topic will be taken up brie￿ y in Section 3.
2.2 A One-Stage Game with an Intermediary
In the one-stage game with an intermediary, the EN does not apply directly to
the track of BUs, but instead, she applies, if at all, through an intermediary,
IN, who charges a fee, say f. IN then applies to the track of BUs, playing a
role analagous to that of EN in the previous subsection. The intermediary￿ s fee
is actually paid only upon approval of the project. EN knows the fee before
making the decision. If EN does not apply to IN, the game is over, and every
player￿ s payo⁄is zero. If EN applies to IN, then IN then begins visiting each BU
in the prescribed order. Let an = 1 or 0 according as IN does or does not apply
to BUn. If he does apply, he incurs a cost k > 0, and then learns the magnitude
bn of the bribe demanded by BUn. If IN pays the bribe, the project is approved
by BUn, and IN goes on to the next BU (if there are any remaining). If IN
does not pay the bribe demanded by BUn, the game ends, and the payo⁄s are
as follows: For m < n, BUm gets a payo⁄ bm, IN loses the application costs
and bribes already incurred, and the other players get zero. If the project is
approved by all the BUs, then it is approved by the track. In this case, EN￿ s
payo⁄ is the value of the project less IN￿ s fee, IN￿ s payo⁄ is the fee less the
application fees and bribes that he has paid, and each BU￿ s payo⁄ is the bribe
that he has been paid. Again, it is assumed that the BUs do not observe the
bribes demanded by the other BUs.
More formally, We shall make a corresponding adaptation of the notation
for the players￿actions. Let a = 1 or 0 according as EN does or does not apply
to IN, an = 1 or 0 according as IN does or does not apply to BUn, and pn = 1
or 0 according as IN does or does not pay the bribe demanded by BUn. From
the above description of the game,
a = 0 ) a1 = 0: (8)
5an = 0 ) pn = 0; (9)
pn = 0 ) am = 0 for all m > n: (10)
Let p = pN: Note that the project is approved if and only in p = 1. The
payo⁄s to EN, IN, and BUn are, respectively,
U0 = p[V (t) ￿ f];
W = pf ￿
X
1￿n￿N
[ank + pnbn]; (11)
Un = pnbn; 1 ￿ n ￿ N:
As noted in the previous subsection, in [LMRa and LMRb] the analysis
of the dynamic game with no intermediary makes use of null-strategy-pro￿le
(NSP) equlibria of the one-stage game. However, in the analysis of the sequential
game with an intermediary (in the following subsection) we do not make use of
any information about equilibria of the one-stage game, and so we omit that
here.
2.3 A Dynamic Game with an Intermediary
We now turn to the main results of this note, which concern a dynamic game
with an intermediary. In this dynamic game, there is a sequence of enterpre-
neurs, EN(t), t = 0;1;2; ad inf, a single intermediary, IN, and a single track of
bureaucrats, BU1,...,BUN. Enterpreneur EN(t) has a project with a potential
value V (t). Each of the entrepreneurs, in succession, plays the one-stage game
described in the preceding subsection with the same intermediary and bureau-
crats. We extend the notation of the one-stage game to the dynamic game in
the obvious way, so that the actions of the players in the game of stage t are
f(t);a(t);an(t);pn(t);bn(t), and we let p(t) = pN(t). These actions must satisfy
the constraints corresponding to (8)-(10). The one-stage payo⁄s corresponding
to (11) are U0(t);W(t);Un(t), respectively. The dynamic-game payo⁄ for E(t)
is U0(t), and the dynamic-game payo⁄s for IN and the BUs are their respec-
tive total discounted one-stage payo⁄s, with a common discount factor, ￿. We
assume that
fV (t)gare independently and uniformly distributed on[0;1]; (12)
k > 0; (13)
Nk < 1: (14)
(The last assumption is needed to keep the game from being trivial.)
Finally, to complete the description of the dynamic game, we need to specify
the information available to each player at each stage of the game. Recall that
we have assumed that, within any one stage, the BUs do not observe the bribes
demanded by the other BUs. Regarding the information that players have about
the history of previous stages, we make the following assumption:
6Assumption I. The players in any one period know nothing about the his-
tory of the game in previous periods other than the previous history of the trans-
actions in which they directly participated.
Even with this draconian assumption, we shall show that - because of the
presence of the long-lived intermediary - if the players￿discount factor is close
enough to unity, then there is a family of equilibria for which there is a positive
probability that an EP will apply to the intermediary, who will pay the bribes
demanded, and the entrepreneur and the intermediary will both retain a positive
surplus. However, in contrast with the "Folk-Theorem-like" result for the game
without an intermediary, the equilibrium set may be bounded away from social
e¢ ciency when the discount factor approaches unity.
Since the entrepreneurs EN(t) are di⁄erent for di⁄erent stages t, the dy-
namic game that we have just described is not, strictly speaking, a "repeated
game." Nevertheless, because of the assumption that the project values, V (t),
are independently and identically distributed, the method of analyisis and the
results will bear some similarity to those for repeated games. Hence we shall,
with some abuse of terminology, refer to the dynamic game as the supergame.
We shall now describe a particular family of strategy pro￿les of the su-
pergame. The equilibria in this family will be indexed by a vector of parameters,
￿ = (f;b1;:::;bN): (15)
In what follows, in equilibrium, f will be the fee charged by IN, and bn will be




(k + bn): (16)
Thus C is IN￿ s total cost if the project is approved by the entire track. The
vector ￿ is required to satisfy the constraints:
bn > 0; 0 ￿ n ￿ N; (17)







C < f < 1: (20)
Given ￿, the players￿strategies are determined as follows. EN(t) applies to
IN if and only if the value of her project exceeds IN￿ s fee, i.e.,
a(t) = 1 , V (t) > f(t): (21)
IN always charges the same fee:
f(t) = f, for all t: (22)
7Say that IN is open in period t if in period t he applies to the BUs on behalf
of EN(t) when requested; otherwise, we shall say that IN is closed. IN is open
in period 0. Say that BUn defects in period t if bn(t) > bn. If IN applies to
BUn in period t, then he pays the bribe demanded if and only if BUn does not
defect.
With the speci￿cation of the strategy pro￿le given thus far, EN(t) will ap-
ply to IN if and only if V (t) > f. If EN(t) does apply, then IN will apply to
each BU in the track, pay the bribes bn, and the project will be approved. We
shall complete the speci￿cation of the strategies by describing what happens
if the above speci￿cation is violated at some node in the game tree. Say that
a shock occurs in period t at BUn if he defects in period t, and IN does pay
the bribe demanded. When a shock occurs in a period, then IN remains open
for the remainder of that period, but remains closed for all succeeding periods.
Furthermore, if a shock occurs in a period at BUn, then in all subsequent pe-
riods the latter will demand a bribe equal to b0
n, which we shall specify below.
Otherwise, BUn demands the bribe bn speci￿ed in the vector ￿ until his next
defection, if any. We shall call this entire strategy pro￿le the ￿-INSP.
It remains to specify the threat bribes, b0
n, and for this we need some
additional notation. For each n (1 ￿ n ￿ N), de￿ne:
Pn = k +
X
m<n




(k + bm): (24)
Thus Pn is IN￿ s total ￿sunk cost" in the current period preceding his decision
whether to pay the bribe bn(t), and Sn is the cost of applying and paying the
￿-INSP bribes to the succeeding BUs in the track. Note that
Pn + bn + Sn = C: (25)
The threat bribe b0
n is de￿ned as
b0






n ￿ bn = f ￿ Sn ￿
Pn
2
￿ bn ￿ f ￿ C > 0:
When the players use the ￿-INSP strategy pro￿le, if IN applies to the track
of BUs, then his one-period payo⁄ (net revenue) equals




Note that, by (18), R > 0.







then a ￿-INSP strategy pro￿le satisfying (17) - (19) is an equilibrium.
Proof. It is immediate that EN(t)￿ s strategy is a best response to those of
the other players. Given the strategies of the other players, if in period t IN
demands a fee equal to b, his expected net pro￿t in that period is
(b ￿ C)Pr(V > b) = (b ￿ C)(1 ￿ b):





Now suppose that BUn defects in period t; without loss of generality, we
may take t = 0. If IN does not pay the bribe, then he loses Pn in period 0, but








On the other hand, if he did pay the bribe, then his payo⁄ in period 0 would be
f ￿ Pn ￿ bn(0) ￿ Sn:
However, in all succeeding periods BUn would demand the bribe b0
n, and IN￿ s
per-period total cost of getting the project approved would be
Pn + b0
n + Sn = Pn + bn + Sn








hence it would be optimal for IN not to apply in the succeeding periods, and
his payo⁄s would be zero. Hence it is optimal for IN not to pay the ￿defection
bribe" bn(0) > bn if
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿


















which veri￿es the inequality in the Theorem.
In any period, BUn should not demand strictly less than bn. On the other
hand, if he demands more than bn, then his payo⁄ will be zero in that period,
without any future bene￿t.
Finally, it is straightforward to verify that no strategy in a ￿-INSP strategy
pro￿le satisfying (17) - (19) is dominated, even weakly. For the BUs, this
depends on the bribes bn being strictly positive. This completes the proof of
the Theorem.
Remark 1. In this family of equilibria, IN￿ s fee is determined by the vector
of bribes, (b1;:::;bN), and the multiplicity of this vector is constrained by (17)-
(18). As the discount factor approaches unity, the "most e¢ cient" equilibria in
the family approach an outcome with zero bribes (b1 = ::: = bN = 0) and the
smallest fee, f = (1 + Nk)=2 (see Section 3 for de￿nitions and a discussion of
alternative concepts of e¢ ciency).
Remark 2. With higher bribes, IN receives lower payo⁄s, and the BUs
receive higher payo⁄s up to a point. One can verify that the total expected








Remark 3. In the version of the ￿-INSP presented here, once the IN
is closed, he is closed forever. This corresponds to what Aumann has called
a "grim punishment strategy." Alternatively, IN could remain closed for some
predetermined number of periods, (a parameter of IN￿ s strategy), corresponding
to what Aumann has called a "relenting punishment strategy." For this latter
kind of strategy, one can prove results similar to those presented here, provided
the punishment period is "long enough."
3 Comparison with the Case of No Intermedi-
ary.
In (LMRa) and (LMRb) we studied a model of a dynamic game with no inter-
mediary, based on the one-stage game described in Section 2.1. We shall refer to
that as the "NoIN model." We shall not describe the NoIN model in any detail,
but just highlight the main di⁄erences in the assumptions and results compared
to the model of Section 2.3, the "IN model."
The most important di⁄erence in the assumptions (aside from the absence of
an intermediary) concerns the information that players have about the history
of previous stages. For the NoIN model, we made the following assumption:
Assumption N. At the beginning of period t, all the current players know
the history of all defections (if any) in all periods up to and including period
10t￿1. In addition, all players know the history of the transactions in which they
directly participated.
Observe that Assumption N is related to Assumption I by the addition of
the ￿rst sentence, and hence is strictly stronger.
Stemming from this di⁄erence in Assumptions N and I is an important dif-
ference in the results. To state the relevant results for the NoIN model, we
￿rst give a heuristic description of a trigger strategy pro￿le (TSP). There is a
vector, (b1;:::;bN); of normal bribes. We shall say that BUn defects in a par-
ticular period if in that period he demands a bribe that strictly exceeds his
normal bribe. If and when a defection takes place, then all players will play
the null-strategy-pro￿le of the one-stage game (see Section 2.1) in all subsequent
periods. (By Assumption N, if a defection occurs, all the players learn about it
at the beginning of the next period.) Hence, once a defection occurs all players
receive a zero payo⁄ in all subsequent periods. If a TSP forms an equilibrium
of the NoIN dynamic game we shall call it a TSP equilibrium (TSPE). In a
TSPE, each bureaucrat always demands his normal bribe, and each project with
a potential value that exceeds the total costs of application and norrmal bribes
is approved.
Before stating the next theorem, we de￿ne a concept of "economic e¢ ciency,"
or "e¢ ciency" for short. Recall that the cost of application of each entrepreneur
EN(t) to each bureaucrat in the track is c > 0. We shall call an outcome of the
game e¢ cient if every project whose potential value exceeds Nc is approved.
In particular, in any equilibrium whose outcome is e¢ cient the bribes must be
zero. One can prove that, with some additional technical conditions:
Theorem 3 If the normal bribes are strictly positive and satisfy the constraint
N X
n=1
(c + bn) < 1; (32)
then there exists ￿
￿ < 1 su¢ ciently large such that, for all ￿ ￿ ￿
￿, the TSP is an
equilibrium of the supergame. Furthermore, as the discount factor approaches
unity, there is a sequence of TSP equilibria whose outcomes approach e¢ ciency.
The conclusion of this last theorem contrasts with that of 2, since in any
INSP equilibrium the fee is, by (16) and (19), at least (1 + Nk)=2, which by
(14) is strictly greater than Nk. Hence, if k ￿ c then the outcome of an INSP
equilibrium is not e¢ cient. On the other hand, if k < c, then for ￿ su¢ ciently
close to unity there are TSP equilibria that are e¢ cient. In other words, if IN
can apply to the track at lower cost than the ENs can, then the outcome of an
INSP equilibrium can be e¢ cient if the fee and the bribes are not to high.
However, if k < c (which would seem to be the "normal" case), it could be
argued that, in the de￿nition of e¢ ciency, Nc should be replaced by Nk. With
this de￿nition of e¢ ciency, even as ￿ ! 1 the outcome of INSP equilibria are
bounded away from e¢ ciency.
114 Concluding Remarks
It would be desirable to extend the IN model in a number of directions that are
beyond the scope of this note. Here are some possible and interesting extensions:
1. Include the option for the ENs to apply directly to the track of BUs.
However, if the ENs did not obtain information about the bribes demanded in
previous periods, it would be di¢ cult for them to sustain reasonable supergame
equilibria on their own. Furthermore, it would be natural to assume that the
ENs￿application cost is higher than that of the IN, so that it seems likely that
any equilibria that involved direct applications by the ENs would be dominated
by equilibria in which the IN did the applying.
2. Consider multiple intermediaries, and competition among them. Multiple
intermediaries might di⁄er in the "quality" of the service that they provide, e.g.,
speed of approval, probability of detection of bribery, etc.
2. Introduce some structure of anti-corruption enforcement, including su-
pervisors as players.
3. Vary the information structure concerning the history of the game and
the values of the projects.
4. Consider more general distributions of project values, and even more
general processes of entrepreneur arrival.
5. Analyze the e⁄ects of various "reform" proposals.
(Regarding the last extension in the context of the NoIN model, see [LMRa
and LMRb].)
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5 Bibliographic Notes and References
A thorough review of the literature on the present topic is beyond the scope of
this note. There are only a few published game-theoretic analyses of interme-
diaries and corruption. The most recent appears to be by Hasker and Okten
(2007), which contains references to the previous literature. We also note the
paper by Bayar (2005). Indeed, we are not aware of any theoretical analyses of
petty corruption, with or without intermediaries, using a dynamic-game model.
For references to the more general topic of corruption, and to game-theoretic
analyses in particular, see (LMRa) and Lambsdor⁄ (2007). For insightful ob-
servations on the general topic of enforcement, see (Hurwicz, 1993, 1998).
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